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Note TOPICS, Professors, and Scholarship: An 
Autobiographical Sketch of a Law School 
Experience 
Jason Broth * 
Introduction 
How does a law student fonn a note topic? Typically, a student is 
instructed to find a pressing legal issue about which no one has yet written. 
That student finds the relevant cases, journal articles, and any other 
applicable materials written on this topic. He or she then uses these 
materials to summarize the current state of the law, expose the problem 
with the law, and propose some sort of remedy, while making certain that 
the work includes an outrageous number of footnotes to justify its 
scholastic value. Most, or at least many, students use this approach to 
note-writing. It was what I began to do before frustration overtook me. 
This process of note-writing leads toward topics regarding narrow issues of 
law, such as differing liability under each state's particular tort statute or 
how the criminal law fails to adequately address a specific problem. I do 
not intend to degrade this type of topic, as many lawyers and perhaps 
judges find these articles useful. The narrow manner in which the notes are 
constructed, however, causes them to become abstracted from the questions 
that press at the heart of the legal system and, as such, possess value for 
only a small class of people. 
It is important that at least some notes deal with the broader issues of 
the legal system rather than narrow issues of law. Only through an 
examination of these broader systemic issues can individuals begin to have 
an effect on the way in which the legal system functions within our society 
and thereby suggest alternatives to address the broader economic and social 
problems that persist in this nation. Some note writers should attempt to 
study questions about the legitimacy of the legal system, the problems and 
* The author is a 1996 graduate of University of California, Hastings College of the 
Law. This piece was originally composed as his student note. He would like to give 
special thanks to Michelle Robbins for her invaluable assistance in preparing this work. 
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biases built into the way in which law is practiced and taught, alternative 
perspectives of the law, and other more philosophical, critical, and 
theoretical approaches to the legal profession and legal scholarship. This 
is the direction in which I will proceed with this note. 
Some readers of this introduction may be thinking, "Here we go 
again ... with another Critical Legal Studies (CLS) person complaining 
about the problems of the legal system ... another young Duncan Kennedy 
reader about to attack the hierarchy of the law." Perhaps this is a fair 
assessment of my project. I concur with most of Kennedy's insights and 
observations detailed in his splendid 1982 essay, "Legal Education as 
Training for Hierarchy."1 To some degree, it is difficult for me to avoid 
duplicating Kennedy. This piece, however, is far more autobiographical 
than Kennedy's work; it combines Kennedy's critical style with the 
autobiographical format of books like One L 2 or Broken Contract.3 With 
this in mind, a brief description of Kennedy's essay provides a necessary 
foundation for the reader. 
The guiding idea in Kennedy's essay, which he announces in the first 
sentence, is that law school is a political environment, despite the attempt 
of the law school system to appear neutra1.4 This appearance of neutrality 
insidiously forces the law student to engage the law school experience in 
a particular manner and manipulates the student unknowingly into a 
particular ideological attitude toward law, society, and the economy. At the 
same time, the student becomes a part of the hierarchy that is law school 
in order to join the greater hierarchy that is in fact the legal system. 
Kennedy describes this system by discussing legal education and legal 
teaching techniques in a general manner and then shows how these 
techniques contribute to the disorientation, followed by the metamorphosis, 
of the students. 5 He also describes why it is nearly impossible, even for 
the leftist student, to be critical of the law school experience. 6 On this 
point, I believe Kennedy's essay is somewhat dated and is perhaps where 
my particular experience in law school will extend and redevelop 
Kennedy's thinking. 
Kennedy writes that most left thinkers are basically helpless at the 
hands of the curriculum because they have only two tools of analysis at 
their disposal: "rights" analysis or traditional Marxism. 7 The former, he 
1. Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy, in THE POLITICS OF 
LAW 38-58 (David Kairys ed., 1982). 
2. SCOTT TUROW, ONE L (1977). 
3. RICHARD KAHLENBERG, BROKEN CONTRACT: A MEMOIR OF HARV ARD LAW SCHOOL 
(1992). 
4. KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 38. 
5. Id. at 38-43. 
6. Id. at 46-47. 
7. !d. at 46. 
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and I both agree, is seductive yet ultimately illogical and cannot lead to a 
meaningful transformation of society. The latter is "critical of law but also 
dismissive"g because it envisions law as a lackey of class conflict; this 
approach results in an entire rejection of the system without allowing one 
to engage with it and then criticize it from within. 
Although I agree that some left students are mired down in these two 
types of thinking, many contemporary students' exposure to Jacques 
Derrida, Michel Foucault, Walter Benjamin, and Georg Lukacs at the 
undergraduate level has armed them with additional ammunition in their 
arsenal of critical analysis.9 Previously, these thinkers were primarily 
studied by graduate students, but, as commonly occurs over time, their 
writings filtered down to the lower levels as they became more "canonical" 
and accepted. As a result, I will focus on the complexity and personal 
disparity of the new left student in dealing with the situation in law school 
and the alienation created by the legal education system, a topic that 
Kennedy only addresses in his conclusion. I will also discuss the 
prevailing attitudes in society toward education generally, attitudes which 
have increasingly. made the 1990s a hostile place for many progressive 
thinkers. I will use my own experiences to illustrate my points and trace 
my history from the end of my college years to the writing of this note as 
a way of allowing any individual, lawyer or not, to reflect on the trend in 
American colleges and universities. This note is not meant to be an 
empirical study; I do not pretend to speak for anybody else's experience 
but my own. Even with that in mind, however, I feel that the observations 
of an individual can be used as a tool to reflect on the entirety of the 
system and the trend in society. Ultimately, I hope to show that the 
changes in our universities result from a backlash by some scholars based 
not on intellectual difference but on a prejudice that is deeply imbedded in 
the Anglo-American system. Finally, this discreditation of new left 
thinking is a means to thwart social change and to reinforce the corporate 
vision of America. 
I. Prior to Law School 
The formulation of this topic was a hard fought battle, yet it was within 
this battle that I found myself confronted with the same questions about the 
appropriate role of a progressive thinker that have plagued me since my 
college years. I was an English major at Vassar College, where I spent the 
bulk of my final two years studying not only literature but also literary 
8. /d. at 47. 
9. These four authors are all 20th Century continental thinkers. Derrida and Foucault are 
usually equated with French postmodemism. Benjamin and Lukacs are two of the major 
neo-Marxist philosophers. 
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theory and philosophy. I was especially close to two of my professors, 
each of whom had Yale Ph.D.s and studied under Harold Bloom. Through 
my personal and academic association with them, I developed a strong 
background in Romantic poetry and American Transcendentalism, with a 
major influence from Harold Bloom, Geoffrey Hartman, 1. Hillis Miller, 
Paul de Man,lo and Jacques Derrida. Simultaneously, I had a great 
personal interest in Indian literature, culture, and storytelling; accordingly, 
I studied the works of Roland Barthes, Michel Foucault, Claude Levi-
Strauss and some "post-colonial" critics, including Gayatri Spivak. II 
The culminating event of these studies was the creation of my senior 
thesis, which addressed a book entitled The Education of Little Tree. 12 
This perplexing fictional work was a best seller as an American Indian 
autobiography. It was not written by an Indian, however, but by Forrest 
Carter, a former Ku Klux Klan member and known southern white racist. 
The factual situation surrounding this book was perfect for a post-
structuralist discussion of the issues of author, text, authenticity, meaning, 
and beauty. I used the above-mentioned theorists to examine, de-con-
struct,13 and semiotic ally explore both the text and, importantly, the 
critical and popular reaction to the text. This thesis was not simply about 
an enigmatic book. Rather, this book was a vehicle to use critical theory 
to reflect on the prevailing culture that created it, loved it, and then finally 
loathed and discarded it. 
Within this project, I discovered not only the "academic" value of 
critical theory but also the "real world" implications that it imports. 
Critical theory can compel educators to confront the issues of what we 
should read, why we should read it, and how it will influence our system 
10. These four scholars were all professors at Yale University and came to be known as 
"the Yale School." Their primary literary focus was in Romantic poetry, though their 
contribution to literary theory, especially that of Bloom and de Man, was great. 
11. The importance of Barthes and Foucault in this area is their development of 
semiotics, the study of the system of signs. Levi-Strauss was a social anthropologist and 
a forerunner of structuralism. Spivak is currently a noted critic of post-colonial literature. 
12. FORREST CARTER, THE EDUCATION OF LITTLE TREE (University ofN.M. Press 1986) 
(1976). 
13. Although the word is usually written as "deconstruction," without the hyphen, I 
decided to use the style in which Derrida originally writes the word so as to draw some 
attention to its constituent parts. I feel that this brief treatment of deconstruction is necessary 
because of the many legal scholars who have broadly misunderstood the idea and its process 
and, as a result, are likely to dismiss any scholarship which fails to make some sort of direct 
treatment of this concept when it is raised. These scholars tend to think of deconstruction 
as the explosive and chilling destruction of some sacred edifice. As Derrida himself 
explains when he introduces the word in Of Grammatology, demolition is not the proper 
metaphor for his concept: "Further, it inaugurates the destruction, not the demolition but 
the de-sedimentation, the de-construction, of all the significations that have their source in 
that of the logos." JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY 10 (Gayatri Chakravorty 
Spivak trans., 1976). 
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of apprehending the world. Exploring these issues is not about changing 
the lives of individuals in dramatic ways or reforming the ills of society in 
a moment. Rather, it is about infusing into the discourse a self-reflective 
aspect which, over time, will hopefully generate greater societal examina-
tion of our situations and the influences in our lives. Imbedded in this 
summary lies my belief that a scholar who challenges our assumptions 
about the world possesses the potential power to influence change and 
make a proverbial difference. 14 
As is common with many graduating college seniors today, I was 
confronted with the question of what course of graduate study to pursue. 
This decision was as difficult for me as it was for many other law school 
students whom I have subsequently met. Even though we came from a 
wide variety of academic fields, we still faced the same dilemma: do I 
choose the field which I feel is more challenging, more intellectually 
exciting, and closer to my heart, or do I go to law school? Obviously, this 
phrasing of the question reflects my bias. Despite this bias, I, like many 
others who share it, made the choice to go to law school. How does one 
account for this discrepancy between desire and decision? 
Several explanations for this phenomenon exist, but I consider two to 
be the most relevant. The first regards the pure economics of the matter. 
The career opportunities in many academic fields, particularly English, 
which would have been my choice, are limited. Professorships are 
becoming increasingly difficult to obtain, and there are few other jobs for 
which a Ph.D. is not an over-qualification. On the other hand, no matter 
how many complaints there are about our society's excess of lawyers, 
numerous jobs are available to an individual with a law degree. Addition-
ally, a lawyer has the potential for earning a great deal of money, 
particularly at the high end of the economic spectrum. Although this was 
not my goal, being able to obtain a job was. Many students feel that in 
order to make the costly investment of attending graduate school, they must 
be assured of a return; thus, they frequently choose law school over the 
competing field. IS 
Secondly, many people choose law school over competing academic 
fields because of the old-fashioned belief that the law can be a vehicle for 
social justice and social change. This notion was largely influential on my 
own decision to attend law school. Although a philosophy or English 
professor may influence society through both teaching and writing, that 
effect is long-term (multi-generational), abstract, and somehow always 
14. I use this word "difference" in its ordinary meaning. 
15. Although the critique of a system that, in effect, prefers tort and contract attorneys 
to molecular biologists and authors might be appropriate, that topic will be left to others 
who think in this same vein. 
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deferred. Reminiscent in my mind is the beginning of the Langston 
Hughes poem "Dream Boogie": 
Good morning, daddy! 
Ain't you heard 
The boogie-woogie rumble 
Of a dream deferred? 
Listen closely: 
You'll hear their feet 
Beating out and beating out a--
You think 
It s a happy beat?16 
Although the project of incremental change is of extraordinary importance, 
this section of Hughes' poem strikes a heartstring with me regarding the 
uncertainty of it all. It is a dream, but how do you know that it will 
happen? How do you know that you are moving toward it without any 
tangible evidence? Even the noted literary critic Henry Louis Gates 
instructed, "I tell students who want to change the world to go into a 
different field."I? The law offers a seemingly more aggressive, proactive, 
and tangible approach to reform. In Marxist terms, even though one does 
not see the discourse change, one can see the wealth redistributed. To a 
young progressive, as Kennedy and I concur, this is the lure of the law. 
This choice to pursue a legal education over one in an academic field 
does not, however, represent an abandonment of the learnings of contempo-
rary thinkers. In the naivete of the graduating college student lurks the 
unfounded hope that one will be able to merge Marx, Freud, and Derrida 
with the teachings of a legal education. Unfortunately, only an occasional 
law school professor welcomes this type of thought. Admissions policies 
are designed to thwart it, hiring policies are designed to disfavor it, and 
grading and ranking schemes, as well as the bar exams, are created to stifle 
it. Virtually everything in the law school setting and, in fact, in society in 
general has been put in a position to discredit progressive thinking. This 
realization invoked in me first a sense of alienation and later the hostility 
that has led to this note, in which I will trace chronologically the 
intellectual inadequacies I have encountered through my first two years of 
law school. 
16. LANGSTON HUGHES, SELECTED POEMS OF LANGSTON HUGHES 221 (1959). 
17. Gary Kamiya, Civilization & Its Discontents, S.F. EXAMINER, Jan. 22, 1995, (Maga-
zine), at 19. 
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II. One L 
Although I felt somewhat guilty and saddened by the pragmatic 
decision that I had made in coming to law school, I entered with an air of 
optImIsm. My first semester classes were Contracts, Property, Civil 
Procedure and Criminal Law. Of the four, I was most excited about 
Property and Criminal Law, as I felt that these classes were directly 
relevant to the lives of a huge segment of the population, and I had already 
formulated many of my own critiques of the existing systems in these 
areas. It was not long before I realized that my extra-legal thinking 
regarding these and the other areas of the law which I was studying had 
little place for expression. These thoughts had, at best, borderline relevance 
to the lives of most students and professors, who viewed them as some sort 
of academic or artistic oddity. They were like paintings to be hung on the 
wall, glanced at sometimes, admired occasionally, discussed rarely, and 
even more rarely meditated upon. Law school was only for learning the 
way in which the law worked. 
With this understanding, I tried to do outside reading to supplement my 
case books and maintain a connection to those underlying philosophies and 
principles that had guided me toward law school. I purchased two books 
that semester to satisfy these cravings: Discipline & Punish by Michel 
Foucault l8 and an essay collection entitled The Politics of Law. 19 I read 
all of the Foucault book and parts of the other book, generally finding them 
to be thoughtful and distinguished works. Unfortunately, the time 
constraints and institutional pressures of my required homework prevented 
me from continuing my outside reading. Although I felt no great desire to 
be in the top of my class, I still felt the pressure of the grading system 
because of its constant presence in many other student's minds. Thus, my 
outside reading was diminished. 
Perhaps even more harmful than my limited exposure to critical reading 
material during my first semester was the lack of teachers and colleagues 
who were interested in discussing and exploring these ideas. Prior to my 
law school experience, a huge portion of the learning process in my life 
had been comprised of intellectual interaction with students in an intimate 
atmosphere. This type of interaction did not exist in the first year of law 
school. Classes were large and lecture-oriented. Law professors did not 
expect creative or alternative thinking; in fact, they discouraged such 
thinking and, instead, favored those with the ability to quickly explain the 
facts, issues, and holdings of cases. There was no discourse; there was an 
examination. Kennedy has been comprehensive and critical on the issue of 
18. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE & PUNISH (Alan Sheridan trans., 1979). 
19. THE POLITICS OF LAW (David Kairys ed., 1982). 
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the teaching style in law school,2° so I end my discussion here in favor of 
one regarding the law school student body. 
The rigid focus by the admissions board on grades and LSAT scores 
has lead to the acceptance of many students who have chosen law school 
for the respect accorded to lawyers by family and friends and the high 
average salaries that lawyers make. There is seemingly little personal focus 
in the admissions process on the goals and motivations of the students, 
except perhaps as an afterthought to grades and test scores. As a result, 
many left-thinking students who regard law school not as a precisely 
calculated career move but as a means of putting themselves in a position 
to achieve some social goal are excluded from top law schools because 
they simply do not make the grade.21 Accordingly, my intellectual 
interaction with many of my colleagues was on matters which to me were 
superficial, and my ability to advance radical conceptions of the law 
dwindled more each day. Ultimately, my first semester was filled with an 
exceptional feeling of loneliness tempered only by assurances from my 
faculty advisor that there were others like me and that in the second year 
I would have more freedom in choosing my classes and thus be better able 
to find my niche. 
My second semester was substantially like my first in terms of the 
classes and professors that I had. Thus, my initial feelings about law 
school remained essentially unchanged, with one slight variation. The 
intimidation of the classroom environment gradually decreased as the 
students became more accustomed to the method, and many began to feel 
more comfortable and relaxed. As my own intimidation level lessened, 
however, my resentment began to blossom. During this semester, much of 
my frustration and sadness began to tum into the anger that I described in 
the opening of this essay. Rather than catalog my thoughts and feelings, 
however, I will relate two anecdotes from my second semester where my 
alienation in law school readily surfaced. 
My Contracts course was year-long and taught by a conservative 
faculty member. During the second semester, the course reached the topic 
of unconscionability. The professor was examining a case in which the 
court had used this doctrine to rule a contract void. The terms of the 
contract suggested that one party used its wealth and legal knowledge to 
the severe disadvantage of the other party, who was in a dis empowered 
position. The professor acknowledged this point but then proceeded to 
explain why this case represents terrible decision-making because it departs 
20. KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 50-56. 
21. This is not to say that left-thinking students have poor scores and grades but that they 
may be more concerned with intellectual development and thereby less focused on grades 
and, particularly, standardized test scores. 
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from the rules and thereby undermines the determinability of the law, thus 
driving up the cost of business and making it worse for everybody (except, 
of course, the plaintiff in the case). I responded to the professor with an 
opposing point of view, indicating to him that there were fallacies in his 
description of the market, that unconscionability is as predictable a rule as 
any other, and that it is not "bad policy" for judges to intervene on the 
behalf of parties who are in unfairly disadvantaged bargaining positions. 
He accepted my argument without much response other than asking me 
how my "tender conscience" felt about the result in the next case, which 
brought rolls of laughter from the class. I had just been taught a lesson. 
Law school was not a discussion; it was dictation. As I had previously 
thought but had not proven until that moment, this professor would not 
allow dissent. His response to me did not address the merits of my 
argument but was to ridicule my political position as naive, nurturing, 
effeminate and clearly other than the "law." To add injury to insult, I was 
then put on the other-than-Socrates end of his ritualistic Socratic dialogue. 
The other relevant anecdote during my second semester amusingly 
illustrates my point about the lack of engagement by many students. 
During my statutory course on Consumer Health and Safety, the professor 
was discussing the impact of expose literature on industry. One student, 
who spoke routinely in that class, offered his opinion: (I paraphrase), "I 
believe that writings like Unsafe at Any Speed22 and Slaughterhouse 
Five,23 regarding the meat packing industry,... [are beneficial]." I 
chuckled and shook my head, while most other students simply sat silently. 
Moments later, when he finished speaking, the professor, who was herself 
smiling, corrected his blunder.24 Other than that, however, this point went 
unnoticed. No one seemed to mind the confusion of two major American 
literary and historical works. Why should they; this is law school, and only 
the rules really matter. 
My in-class introduction to legal philosophical scholarship further 
distressed me. Although I will later discuss my views on the ways in 
which theory from the arts and social sciences have thus far been utilized 
by most legal scholars, I am including this prefatory information here since 
it was directly relevant to my first year experience. In the aforementioned 
Consumer Health and Safety course, the professor included a reading on 
statutory interpretation written by Bill Eskridge and Phil Frickey entitled 
"Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning.,,25 The piece attempted 
22. RALPH NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED (1965). 
23. KURT VONNEGUT, SLAUGHTERHOUSE FrvE (1972). 
24. The blunder being that the student meant to refer to Upton Sinclair's classic piece, 
The Jungle. 
25. William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical 
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REv. 321 (1990). 
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to borrow discourse from Hans-George Gadamer and later hermeneutics 
theorists, but as a work of philosophy it is greatly lacking. The authors 
repeatedly used overly broad generalizations, such as referring to "philoso-
phy and literary theory,,26 as a monolith in which all scholarship is 
supposedly unified and in agreement on certain issues. Also, in freely 
borrowing from Gadamer and quoting small phrases out of his work, like 
"hermeneutical circle,,,27 Eskridge and Frickey corrupted such phrases and 
used them to justify their theory and show that it has legitimacy outside of 
the legal realm. I was outraged at the abusive nature of this work; I 
previously had imagined that my only problems with most "journal quality" 
articles would regard the content used by, or the approach of, the author 
and not the academic misrepresentation in the work. 
My frustration was compounded further when we discussed the piece 
in class. The most common and pervasive complaint by other students 
about Eskridge and Frickey was their perpetual and unnecessary use of 
large and abstruse words like hermeneutic. The professor repeatedly 
encouraged these students to look beyond these words and phrases because 
authors only use them "to get published in certain journals." She 
comforted the students by telling them that they were not expected to know 
what these words meant because, in essence, they were just "fancy-talk," 
lacking any importance in and of themselves. 
These experiences reflect two of the major points that this essay seeks 
to address. First, the interdisciplinary scholarship that has been written by 
lawyers is often of poor quality, as a whole, relative to that produced in 
other fields (at least the other fields with which I am familiar, e.g., English 
and Philosophy). Secondly, and much more importantly, law school, 
school in general, and society at large has grown seemingly hostile to 
certain intellectual ideas. This hostility is reflected in the attitude of the 
students, who ascribe the use of words and ideas with which they are 
unfamiliar to a flaw in the writer rather than to their own deficiency. Even 
more frightening was my witnessing of a tenured law school professor 
assure these students that finding out about hermeneutics is basically a 
dictionary exercise and thereby summarily dismiss the continental 
philosophic tradition since Heidegger. 
III. Two L 
Kennedy's description of the law school curriculum closely matches my 
experience. He lists the first year courses, discusses them, and then writes: 
26. Id. at 334. 
27. Id. at 340. 
_ ..__ .. _. _ ~===========================:-=::J 
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Then there are the second- and third-year courses that expound the 
moderate reformist program of the New Deal . . .. Finally, there 
are peripheral subjects, like legal philosophy or legal history . . . . 
These [courses] are presented as not truly relevant to the 'hard' 
objective, serious, rigorous analytic core of the law; they are kind 
of a playground of finishing school for learning the social art of 
self-presentation as a lawyer. 28 
123 
I took both Constitutional Law and Criminal Procedure, the "reformist" 
classes to which Kennedy refers, as well as Jurisprudence, the "peripheral" 
type of class of which Kennedy writes. I also elected to take American 
Indian Law and the Law of Archaeology and Relics. These last two 
courses were small and taken by few students (presumably because of the 
specific nature of the material, in which I was personally interested). 
Despite the fact that I was able to "choose" my courses (this statement is 
misleading, given the extreme amount of coercion built into the system 
based on the size of the classes, the number of classes taught on each 
subject, and the awareness of the later bar exam that covers only certain 
topics), my feelings about law school remained essentially the same. 
These classes, like those of my first year, were not critical of the 
system that created the rules. I was excited to take Constitutional Law 
because I saw that as an area in which judges only and always made policy 
choices based on an arbitrary set of criteria and then justified them in a 
post hoc manner using the language of prior constitutional decisions. As 
a result, Constitutional Law is perhaps the best course to examine the 
"logic" of the rules and expose the fact that it is not logic at all but rather 
a legitimation of a set of rules and values to the benefit of certain people 
and to the disadvantage of others. Unfortunately, few of these ideas 
pertained to my Constitutional Law class experience. Instead, we identified 
case holdings and then tested them against a series of hypothetical 
questions. If they failed the scrutiny of examination, then we concluded 
that the holdings should be modified. Occasionally, the class would focus 
on the fact that a particular decision was made as a matter of policy and 
could not properly be justified using the internal logic of constitutional law. 
Basically, it was just like any and all of my other law school courses. 
Jurisprudence was the topic that I most desired to study. I expected to 
find others "like me" in this course and to begin discovering the philosophy 
of the law. The course turned out to be the gravest disappointment yet. 
The professor was a specialist in federal courts. He knew little of Critical 
Legal Studies and virtually nothing about continental philosophy other than 
about Immanuel Kant (via his use in Anglo-American thinking). The 
28. KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 44-45. 
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course reading was a smattering of unchallenging works. This course 
provides a fine example to support Kennedy's assertion that legal 
philosophy classes are designed to polish a student's edges so as to be able 
to present the facade of a lawyer when at a cocktail party.29 During the 
classroom time, the professor essentially explained the works through 
simplification and translation, followed by a "what's-your-opinion" type of 
open-ended question directed at the entire class. 
I found the class unproductive, uneducational, and taught, at best, on 
the intellectual level of a freshman course in college. Even beyond those 
disappointments, however, the time allocated to the respective authors and 
groups frustrated me the most. Duncan Kennedy was discussed for less 
than one entire class session, while Ronald Dworkin and John Rawls,30 
together, were allotted approximately six class sessions. I assume the 
professor considered this allocation of time well thought-out. To him, 
Dworkin and Rawls were acknowledged brilliant intellectuals who had 
great influence within the American legal community; thus, the course must 
focus more heavily upon them. Continental philosophy, however, so badly 
discredits them that, in my opinion, it renders their work impotent. This 
point of view was never addressed, providing yet another example of the 
uncritical approach to the law. 
This failing cannot be placed solely at the feet of the course's 
professor. It seems not entirely his fault that he was teaching a course for 
which he was underqualified. That fact must be laid at the feet of the law 
school administration .. Why wasn't someone with a deeper humanities or 
CLS background teaching the course? One possible explanation is that 
there are so few people of this type on the faculty that there was not one 
available to teach the course. I know of not one faculty member at my law 
school who would openly refer to himself or herself as a Crit. To repeat, 
there is not one such person on the faculty of the largest law school in 
California. 
Along with the composition of the student body and the school 
admissions policy, one can see an extraordinary bent in the hiring policies 
away from a certain type of thinker with a particular set of ideals. This 
reality can only be explained as evidence of the brewing hostility toward 
far leftist thinking in our colleges and universities. My law school 
seemingly wants to produce lawyers who achieve, in the traditional sense, 
rather than individuals who, armed with knowledge of the law, can help 
29. Id. at 45. 
30. Dworkin and Rawls are generally considered to be two of the most noteworthy 
current legal philosophers. Their work, however, is almost exclusively based on the Anglo-
American tradition, for which reason they often escape the wrath and critique of those who 
routinely attack interdisciplinary scholarship. 
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contribute to the leftist goals of radical change and redistribution of wealth 
and power. 
IV. Writing My Note 
I initially approached the writing of this note with great enthusiasm. 
I saw it as an opportunity to relive the experience of writing my college 
senior thesis, the importance of which I have previously described. 
Unfortunately, the reality of the note-writing process quickly set in, and I 
was adrift in attempting to formulate a topic. After much struggle, 
however, a fascinating topic struck me. My theoretical background was 
heavily influenced by the Yale school, and I thereby decided to apply that 
background to the law. I chose Harold Bloom's theory of poetry developed 
in his work The Anxiety of Influence31 and wanted to apply it to legal 
works, primarily judicial opinion-writing. With this in mind, I began my 
research for supporting materials and completed my preemption check. 
After arduous hours of logging time on Lexis, I discovered a few articles 
that mentioned or discussed Bloom and several more that cited to him. I 
printed these pieces and enthusiastically began reading them. 
Ultimately, I discovered that there were basically only three articles that 
made more than cursory mention of Bloom and his theories. I hoped that 
these articles would establish a foundation for a note which would 
undertake the monumental task of reformulating Bloom's ideas about the 
creative process to fit legal scholars' and judges' discussions of the law. 
Bloom's writing, particularly in The Anxiety of Influence, is extraordinarily 
dense and possesses an uncountable number of obscure allusions. 
Accordingly, I hoped these articles would provide some framework and 
reference point with which to begin my work. 
The first piece, written by Charles Collier, was entitled "The Use and 
Abuse of Humanistic Theory in Law: Reexamining the Assumptions of 
Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship.,,32 Although the title suggests that the 
article would readily lend itself to my topic, Collier essentially supported 
a thesis antithetical to the one in this essay. He used Bloom merely to 
explain that many legal scholars proceed in an interdisciplinary manner 
because of "the theory of intellectual influence and revisionism. ,,33 Collier 
basically contended that such scholars abuse the law by seeking "something 
that law cannot offer ... an external, non-legal source of scholarly 
legitimacy.,,34 He seriously simplifies the goals of interdisciplinary 
31. HAROLD BLOOM, THE ANXIETY OF INFLUENCE (1973). 
32. Charles W. Collier, The Use and Abuse of Humanistic Theory in Law: Reexamining 
the Assumptions of Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship, 41 DUKE L.l. 191 (1991). 
33. !d. at 193. 
34. Id. at 194. 
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scholarship by primarily arguing that legal scholars cannot look to external 
sources for intellectual authority. 
Interdisciplinary scholarship is much more complex than Collier 
suggests. This new scholarship seeks to challenge the assumptions of the 
law as it stands and reconstruct new formulations of the law which (for 
many scholars) are not themselves seeking legitimacy. Rather, these 
reformulations are mere examples of alternative understandings that are 
equally plausible but reflect a different set of underlying assumptions. For 
instance, Roberto Unger describes a system in which the law is constantly 
forced into making radical change so as to recognize, in my reformulation 
of Unger, the illegitimacy of all positions and thereby avoid dogmatic 
acceptance of anyone. 35 I am ultimately grateful to Collier for his 
outstanding historical analysis that reveals how late-nineteenth century 
Langdellian formalism leads to the type of narrow legal note topic that I 
discussed in my introduction.36 His treatment of Bloom's work, however, 
is uninformative and limited. He only applies Bloomian theory to legal 
scholars of the 1980s, explaining their use of the interdisciplinary approach 
as a way of stepping out of the shadow of their precursor scholars of the 
late 1950s and 1960s.37 To borrow a word from Collier's title, this is an 
unsightly "abuse" of Bloom's theory. It is not abusive in that it seeks 
authority where it properly should not, as Collier claims of today's legal 
scholar. Rather, it is intellectually abusive, doing extraordinary violence 
to Bloom's theories by mischaracterizing them and then audaciously merely 
footnoting The Anxiety of Influence. 
In The Anxiety of Influence, Bloom discusses an individual poet's 
relationship to a precursor poet and the specific literary tropes used by 
these poets in fighting the battle to develop a creative space for them-
selves.38 He never speaks of a category of thinkers, and an idea, like the 
use of interdisciplinary scholarship, is not a trope at all. Although never 
said directly, in many ways Collier's critique of this scholarship approaches 
that of my Consumer Health and Safety teacher and is reflected in his 
quotation of Geoffrey Miller: "These are times of ferment in legal 
academia. Standard doctrinal analysis, which all but occupied the field a 
decade ago, is now retreating before the onslaught of all sorts of fancy new 
techniques.,,39 Thus, I believe that Collier's big problem in using Bloom 
is that he confuses Freudian repression with the desire to be published, earn 
tenure, and be hip. 
35. ROBERTO M. UNGER, POLITICS, A WORK IN CONSTRUCTIVE SOCIAL THEORY (1987). 
36. COLLIER, supra note 32, at 195-198. 
37. !d. at 202. 
38. BLOOM, supra note 31. 
39. COLLIER, supra note 32, at 202. 
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As a piece of interdisciplinary scholarship, at least on this point, Collier 
is unimpressive. He did motivate me, however, to shift my note topic in 
my own mind. I began to feel that I could not merely use Harold Bloom 
without justifying why I was using Bloom, why such a topic is valid for a 
law journal, and even why the interdisciplinary approach should continue 
to be used. Ten years ago, in the 1980s, this type of scholarship was 
unquestioned. But now, in the 1990s, the hostility toward this interdisci-
plinary approach has grown and leaves writers like myself to fight a battle 
of justification. Collier's piece and his quotation of Miller are perfect 
examples of the animosity toward certain left thinking that has grown in the 
academic community over the past several years. 
The other two pieces that I found which dealt with Bloom were entitled 
"The Value of Friendship in Law and Literature,,40 and "Agon at Agora: 
Creative Misreadings in the First Amendment Tradition.,,41 The first 
piece, written by Kaufman, was more satisfying than Collier's piece yet 
still not without its problems. Kaufman initially uses the "anxiety of 
influence'~2 in a non-Bloomian sense. It refers instead to the should-be 
anxiety felt by legal scholars who have failed to elevate the status of their 
enterprise in response to Derrida's ingenuitive elevation of philosophy.43 
This "anxiety of influence" is a conscious one and thereby merely shares 
the same name as the anxiety discussed by Bloom. Later in his piece, 
however, Kaufman explicitly discusses Bloom and his theories. Kaufman 
effectively describes Bloom's book and uses it to make excellent insights 
into law, philosophy, and even Bloom himself. He fails, however, to 
actually use the Bloomian tropes to examine judicial opinion-writing. 
Although extremely long, Kaufman's piece lacks specific examples of 
his points and thus provides no guidance for the most difficult question of 
all: how do you identify specific instances of repression in judicial decision 
making? Kaufman's deficiency is acceptable, however, as his project does 
not concern this issue. He asserts two goals for himself. First, he hopes 
to encourage judges to elevate their decision writing.44 Second, he hopes 
to encourage others, particularly legal scholars, to be more accepting of 
Derrida's insight and critical legal scholarship rather than dismissing it.45 
Though I found Kaufman's voice both comforting and friendly, it has been 
at least three years since he wrote this piece, and, in my opinion, the 
40. Michael 1. Kaufman, The Value of Friendship in Law and Literature, 60 FORDHAM 
L. REv. 645 (1992). 
41. David Cole, Agon at Agora: Creative Misreadings in the First Amendment Tradition, 
95 YALE L.J. 857 (1986). 
42. KAUFMAN, supra note 40, at 644. 
43. Id. at 648. 
44. Id. at 713. 
45. Id. 
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hostility toward Derrida and CLS in American legal academic circles grows 
increasingly more hostile despite Kaufinan's efforts. 
The second above-mentioned work, "Agon at Agora" by David Cole, 
is outstanding and precisely on point. Cole discusses Bloom's theories 
thoroughly and with great insight; he is subtle and sensitive to the nuances 
of Bloom. Cole's piece provided both a framework in which I could 
operate and room for disagreement, correction, and further development of 
Bloomian and related criticism in regard to the law.46 By this time, 
however, I was so troubled by my law school experiences and the Collier 
article that I was unable to proceed with my original plan. Cole's article 
was nearly ten years old, and I knew that a topic on Bloom could wait. 
Still, I was tom between proceeding with a topic that was intellectually 
challenging and stimulating, like the one on Bloom, or changing to a more 
mundane, yet important and necessary, topic, such as one addressing 
Collier. My decision became clear after viewing a speech on C-Span in 
January, 1995, and reading an article that same month in the San Francisco 
Examiner Magazine. 
One morning, I happened to watch on C-Span a speech given by the 
newly appointed chairperson of the Presidential Committee on Higher 
Education.47 The thrust of the speech regarded returning "values" and the 
"classics" to higher education. She described the previous generation of 
college students as a lost generation (likely referring to people ages 20-26), 
infatuated by the valuelessness of nihilism. This generation was also, in 
her opinion, dominated by relativism, the bane of society, and the inability 
to appreciate beauty for what it is. She implicitly referred to French 
theory, stemming from scholars like Derrida and Foucault, as the cause of 
this crisis. She drew loud cheers from the audience, yet I was quite 
somber. I had just discovered that I was part of a generation lost and that 
my insights were less valid than those of others. I was part of the 
intelligencia of Generation X and, like my lesser-educated cohorts, was 
devoid of vision. Her message was clear: traditional Democratic thinking 
has no room for a group of postmodern children who cannot learn to 
respect the liberal credo. This irrational hostility obviously targets a certain 
group of left thinkers. 
46. For instance, Cole explicitly says that addressing the feminist critique of Bloom is 
outside of the scope of his project. !d. at 864, n.2S. Yet that topic raises a number of 
fascinating issues when considered in light of the fact that judicial writing has been male 
dominated up until fairly recently. Issues surrounding ways in which judicial opinion-
writing has changed since women have become a force in the judiciary raise unlimited 
intriguing questions. 
47. Unfortunately, it was not until several days after I saw this speech that I realized the 
importance that it had for me. Thus, I am unable to cite the broadcast or even provide the 
name of the speaker. 
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Even more provocative to me than that speech was Gary Kamiya's 
article in the Sunday, January 22, 1995, San Francisco Examiner entitled 
"Civilization & Its Discontents.,,48 Kamiya basically attacks "P.C.ism" on 
college campuses and discusses the short history of the battle surrounding 
political correctness. The article points to the 1987 book, The Closing of 
the American Mind,49 which became a surprise best seller as the beginning 
of the public debate on these matters. Kamiya attacks the ideas of 
"political correctness" and "diversity" as pseudonyms for affirmative action, 
racism, and a senseless and unprincipled assault on tradition. so Although 
Kamiya's unjust characterizations and simplifications of these issues 
disturbed me, I was most angered by his use of certain phrases and words 
that linked his position to that of the C-Span speaker. For instance, in his 
opening paragraph, Kamiya refers to "incomprehensible French philosophi-
cal shrapnel."sl Wisely, Kamiya never mentions Derrida, Lacan, or other 
French scholars so as to avoid the exceptional intellectual difficulty of 
addressing their theories. Instead, he focuses on the effect, as he sees it, 
of the use of these theorists in academic institutions. He points to racial 
and gender conflicts on college campuses and then equates the now 
common use of these thinkers with the creation of the conflicts. 
By a sleight of hand, Kamiya tries to make the reader believe that high 
theory is synonymous with political correctness and multiculturalism. For 
example, he writes, "[b Jut far more disturbing than the strained work 
generated by 'engaged' literary critics is the moral intimidation practiced 
by certain multicultural zealots."s2 He then explains how multiculturalism 
is used as a weapon to unfairly discredit certain traditional scholars, thereby 
stifling them. Kamiya ridiculously makes it appear as if only leftist 
thinkers are allowed on university faculties and that all others have been 
chased away. This experience is far from my own and that of other 
students whom I know. Kamiya exaggerates the situation on college 
campuses as a rhetorical device. He uses hyperbole in order to inflame the 
reader, who is frustrated with the issues of race, gender, and poverty that 
dominate the lives of today's youth. In a most Gingrichian fashion, 
Kamiya hopes to enrage the public into crying for a battle to win back the 
schools. The objective of this battle is not a peaceful coexistence amongst 
all theorists but the annihilation of certain left thinkers. His side, 
unfortunately, seems to be winning. 
Toward the end of the article, Kamiya finally refers to the specific 
French authors responsible for today's problems. In responding to their 
48. KAMIYA, supra note 17. 
49. ALLAN BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND (1987). 
50. KAMIY A, supra note 1 7, at 15. 
51. Id. at 15. 
52. Id. at 22. 
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positions, he resorts to the ultimate analytical tool: ridicule. Kamiya writes, 
"[ e ]verything could be deconstructed; nothing was sacred. Liberalism? A 
fraud. The 'autonomy of the aesthetic'? Don't make me laugh. The 'real 
world'? Puh-Ieeze."53 He then relates a one-liner from "then-Education 
Secretary William Bennet . . . that 'Deconstruction is like the Godfather, 
it makes you an offer you can't understand. ",54 These two sarcastic 
remarks each reflect separate but related points. First, there are certain 
propositions so fundamental that it is not even worth the time to examine 
them. Second, much like the reaction of my Consumer Health and Safety 
class to hermeneutics, if there is a concept that you cannot understand, then 
the philosophy behind it is too complex about which to concern yourself. 
These two points expose a sentiment that is anti-intellectual, irrationally 
hostile, and reflective of nothing more than a political bias and society's 
prevailing attitude toward certain scholarship. 
Conclusion 
As previously mentioned, this note is not an empirical study and 
regards only personal observation. After reading it, however, one can be 
left with no doubt that at my law school, French philosophic thinking is by 
no means the dominant mode of discourse. Similarly, I have found little 
evidence to indicate that, except in certain isolated institutions (for instance, 
the University of Colorado at Boulder, Harvard University, and SUNY 
Buffalo), there is any significant number of thinkers working in this vein. 
Even in his own article, Kamiya includes but glosses over the point that 
Ralph Rader, who is a member of a new organization "dedicated to 
championing aesthetic approaches to literature,,,55 is also the head of the 
English Department at UC Berkeley, one of the top English departments in 
the nation. He is anything but postmodern. Additionally, Secretary Bennet 
and the new chairman of the Presidential Committee on Higher Education 
have demonstrated open hostility toward French theory. Yet Kamiya and 
others speak in a manner which makes it appear as if those who refuse to 
engage in post-structuralist thinking are unable to achieve positions of 
influence and that, as a result, havoc has been wreaked on the system. This 
appears to be pure scapegoating. 
The problems of multiculturalism and racism on our college campuses, 
according to Kamiya and these others, is a result of nihilism brought on by 
Derrida and his cohorts rather than resulting from the inherent racism in the 
system brought on by a nation that has been built on racial intolerance and 
disempowerment of the economic lower classes. Don't blame the system, 
53. Id. at 24. 
54. Id. at 25. 
55. Id. at 21-22. 
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blame individuals who fail to take personal responsibility for how they are. 
This position is a counterfactuaI farce, but, like Allan Bloom's book, it 
sells, and it sells big. People are tired of the message of the "politically 
correct," and conservative scholars have managed to use this sentiment to 
attack leftist thinking. Despite Kamiya's claims about the ease of being a 
left thinker on a college campus, the fact that his article is being published 
and supported indicates that he is not being entirely forthright. 
Although those who discredit leftist thinkers might maintain the belief 
that they speak and act in society's best interests, their beliefs are as 
misguided as those supporting Gingrich and his "Contract with Ameri-
ca. ,,56 If humanity is to advance, certain things must happen, the most 
urgent of which is a redistribution of wealth. CLS and other leftist 
thinking is designed to attack and expose the illegitimacy of both the legal 
system and the norms underlying the legal system which are responsible for 
justifying the current distribution of wealth. Such leftist thinking allows 
individuals to peak behind the veil of "logic" and uncover the unfairness, 
inadequacies, and biases present in our lives. For this reason, it is only in 
the best interest of the wealthiest few Americans to maintain the system as 
it is and discredit, ridicule, and eliminate radical thinkers. These thinkers 
present a well-articulated intellectual threat to the system (much like the 
threat that I presented to my Contracts professor) that has brought these 
Americans wealth and power. As a result, the system has been modified 
to deal with these individuals by forcing them out of colleges, not hiring 
them in the first place, and accepting an indifferent student body, while, at 
the same time, blaming these individuals for creating the problems that they 
actually merely exposed. This is what the battle on college campuses is 
actually about. This is the battle that the leftists are losing. 
56. More properly described as the "Contract on America." 
